WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: SUICIDE RESULTING
FROM MENTAL DISORDER CAUSED BY WORKCONNECTED INJURY HELD COMPENSABLE
REcovERY under workmen's compensation acts is generally limited

to "accidental injuries . . . arising out of and in the course of the
employment."' In the recent case of Harper v. Industrial Commissioe2 the Supreme Court of Illinois was called upon to decide whether
death benefits may be awarded when a compensable injury is followed
by the suicide of the injured employee.
In the Harper case the deceased, while performing heavy work at
his employer's warehouse, sustained a severe back injury requiring a
major operation. Thereafter, he complained about being in pain and his
posture was noticeably altered. There was testimony that he was unable
to perform his usual household tasks and that he became moody and
depressed. He returned to his job about nine months later, but was
given much lighter work than before the accident. Four days later he
left work in the middle of the morning and took his own life. His
widow, on behalf of herself and her minor child, filed a death benefit
petition with the Industrial Commission. The arbitrator found that
Harper's injury had caused his death, and, therefore, his widow was
entitled to an award. The Commission rejected this finding and held
that the death was not "occasioned by or related to" the death. On
review the circuit court determined that the Commission's ruling was
against the weight of the evidence, and reinstated the award. The
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the award, holding that since the
evidence dearly showed a direct causal relationship between the injury
and suicide, it was unnecessary to determine the precise mental condition
of the deceased at the time of the suicide.8
A claimant seeking death benefits for suicide committed after a
compensable injury traditionally has been confronted by a major
-§

'ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, § 138 (Smith & Hurd 195o).
97-2 (.958); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 2, § xo.

See, e.g., N.C.

GEN. STAT.

Ill.2d 48o, 1So N.E.2d 480 (1962).
The evidence offered to show the causal connection between the injury and suicide
was given by two medical witnesses. A psychiatrist testified that there was a direct
causal relationship. He testified that the injury caused a definite psychiatric illness,
and diagnosed it as probably being severe chronic depression. The doctor who had
performed the operation testified that pain and suffering may bring out hidden behavior patterns that would not occur in a normal individual. Id. at 481.
224

3x8o N.E.2d at 483.

Vol. 1962: 6x8]

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

obstacle. 4 Some courts have denied recovery in this situation, on the
theory that the suicide was an independent intervening cause between
the injury and death.' Even those courts usually allowing recovery
have said that suicide may be an intervening cause." The intervening
cause theory in workmen's compensation suicide cases was first enunciated in In re Sponaiski7 and has become the majority view in this
country. In that case the Massachusetts court stated that where a
compensable injury results in insanity, which causes the employee to
commit suicide "through an uncontrollable impulse," and having no
"knowledge of the physical consequences of his act," there is a direct
causal connection between the physical injury and the death.8 However, when the insanity results in suicide "through a voluntary willful
choice," by a person knowing the "purpose and the physical effect of
the suicidal act," then, "even though choice is dominated and ruled by
a disordered mind," the chain of causation is broken.'
The Sponatski test, because of its emphasis on volition and knowledge of physical consequences, has sometimes resulted in the denial of
'Although intervening cause is the major difficulty confronting a claimant, another
obstacle may be encountered. A majority of the workmen's compensation acts contain
a provision excluding compensation for "willful self-inflicted injuries." Only Connecticut, Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Wyoming do not have
such a provision. i LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 36.1o n. 66 (i95z). Even
in those states not having an explicit provision, such as Illinois, a self-inflicted injury
generally would not be considered accidental within the meaning of the statute. This
ISo
position is suggested by the Illinois court in the principal case, - Ill. at -,
N.E.sd at 482, quoting from i ANGERSTEIN, ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
is (rev. ed. -):
"Suicide and self-inflicted injuries are not accidental injuries within the meaning
of the Compensation Act. Where, however, a workman has received an injury which
caused a nervous breakdown, followed by terrible sufferings, long continued despondence or insanity, and if during such period he committed suicide, it would probably
be attributed to the accidental injury and would be compensable." Thus, in resisting
a claim it is often contended that suicide is a self-inflicted injury, and, therefore, there
can be no recovery under the act. Although there seems to be some merit to such
contentions, in application they have not restricted recovery to any great extent. See
Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 95 N.W.zd 40 (1959); Karlen v. Department
of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 301, 249 P.2d 364 (95±).
"E.g., Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447, i8o N.E. 231 (1932); Industrial Comm'n
v. Brubaker, x±9 Ohio 617, x96 N.E. 409 (1935)5 Kasman v. Hillman Coal & Coke
Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d 762 (94).
'E.g., Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, i6 N.E. 431 (.928)i
Gasperin v. Consolidated Coal Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 Ati. 187 (1928) ; McFarland v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.sd 714 (936).
722o Mass. 526, io8 N.E. 466 09g5).
'Id. at 530, io8 N.E. at 468.
'Ibid.
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compensation even though there was an admittedly direct causal connection between the injury and suicide."0 Thus a number of courts
have denied recovery where some degree of volition remained, even
though the will of the injured employee was governed by a disordered
mind resulting from the prior injury.1 Other courts, though purporting to follow the test, have found the uncontrollable impulse necessary
for recovery through manipulation of the intervening cause theory. 2
Indeed, even the court in the Sponatski case, after lying down the
restrictive test, proceeded to affirm the compensation award. 3
As the Harper case' 4 points out, however, the Sponatski test assumes
that capacity to choose is constant and unvarying, and that the pain
and suffering resulting from the injury have no effect upon the rational
mental processes of the individual." When suicide occurs under the
influence of these forces, it may be that the deceased not only had
volition to produce death, but may have actually desired it.1" Moreover, even if the intervening cause theory were utilized, if the evidence
"0See Barber v. Industrial Comm'n,

241

Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 599 (1942), where

the Commission actually found that because of the injury the employee's mind became
affected, that a psychosis developed causing him to lose normal judgment, and that he
would not have committed suicide had it not been for the mental and physical conditions which resulted therefrom. However, he had knowledge of the consequences of
his act, and no compensation was allowed. Another case illustrating the inconsistency
of the test is Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447, 448, xSo N.E. 231, 232 (1932), where
the court said: "The evidence warranted findings that the employee committed
suicide, that he was then insane, and that the insanity resulted from the injury." Notwithstanding this finding, that court failed to award the widow any compensation.
1
" See Industrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935).
"E.g., Schofield v. White, 25o Iowa 57!, 95 N.W.2d 40 (x959); Blasczak v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193 Pa. Super. 422, x65 A.zd x8 (196o); Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 30!, 249 P.2d 364 (1952).
18 22o Mass. 526, 1o
N.-E. 466 (1915). In that case there was testimony indicating that the deceased had a "wild look" just before he jumped from the window.
Other testimony merely showed that he had become despondent. From this the court
inferred that he must have responded to an uncontrollable impulse and, therefore, the
suicide was not an intervening cause.
1, 1go N.E.2d at 482.
"8 The test has been vigorously criticized for its failure to take into consideration
,the effect which these two forces have on an injured employee. I LARSON, op. Cit.
supra note 4, at § 36.20. See Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 190 F.2d 929 (sth
Cir. 195), for an excellent discussion of how the choice and reasoning facilities of an
individual can be affected by such an injury.
See - generally MORGAN & STELLAR, PHYSIOLOGICAL PYCHOLOGY
1950), for a medical treatment of pain and suffering.

250

(2d

ed.

18 One prominent psychologist has said that "probably no suicide is consumated
unless . . . the suicidal person also wishes to die." MENNINGFR, MAN AGAINST HIMSee 45 IOWA L. REv. 669 (196o).
SELF 25 (1938).
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dearly shows that the injury caused a mental disorder which resulted
in self-destruction it would seem inaccurate to say that death was "independently" caused.17 Thus, the Illinois court relied on a leading
Florida case, Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co.,' which recognized that
while suicide may be an independent intervening cause in some cases
"it is certainly not so in those cases where the ...

evidence shows that,

without the injury, there would have been no suicide; [and] that the
suicide was merely an act intervening between the injury and the
death." 9 Therefore, under this analysis the issue of the employee's
volition is irrelevant, and where the evidence tends to establish a
causal relationship the suicide should be compensable.
The concept of intervening cause was developed to keep tort liability
within reasonable limits, and is applied for the same purpose in workmen's compensation cases..' However, any apprehension that the failure to follow the Sponatski rule would result in unwarranted recovery
is unjustified; even under the view adopted by the Illinois court it is
necessary for the claimant to show dearly that the injury resulted in
the mental condition which brought about the death. This burden
cannot be met merely by offering testimony that after the injury the
The number of cases in which the deceased knew what he was doing, and yet his

action was causally linked to the injury through a disordered mind, show that this
pattern is just as prevalent, if not more so, than suicide which results from uncontrollable impulse. E.g., Schofield v. White, 25o Iowa 571, 95 N.W.2d 14o (959)
Prentiss Truck & Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So. 2d 272 (1956) ;
Maricle v. Glazier, 283 App. Div. 402, 128 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1954) i Blasczak v.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., 193 Pa. Super. 422, 165 A.2d 128 (196o).
"See Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d i99 (1942)5
Comment, 5 B.U.L. REV. 233, 236 (1925), where it is said that:
"To say that a condition of injury so excruciating that the sufferer is unable to
resist the opportunity to fly from it to the unknown horror of the grave is not the
cause of the death, but that the cause . . . is the volition of the sufferer, looks prima
facie like applying the rule of novas actus interveniens to a case not within its reasonable scope, . . 21
28 43 8o. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949).
" Id. at 465.
"'The courts have borrowed the proximate cause concept from cases involving
tort liability, where it was developed "to hold the defendant's liability within some
reasonable bounds. . ...
'
PRossER, TORTS § 49, at 267 (2d ed. 1955). Indeed, the
test which the Massachusetts court announced in the Sponatiki case was first enunciated

by that court in a tort liability case, Dainels v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Ry., 183
Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903).
The court in the Daniels case said: "the voluntary,
willful act of suicide of an insane person, . . . who knows the purpose and physical

effects of his act, is such a new and independent agency as does not come within and
complete a line of causation from accident to the death." Ia,. at 399, 67 N.E. at 426.
See generally i

LARSON,

op. cit. supra note 4, at § 13.11, § 36.1o.
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deceased became discouraged and depressed. Rather, there must be
clear medical proof that the injury led to the suidde.22
By rejecting the Sponatski rule in favor of the approach taken by
the Florida Supreme Court, the Illinois court has adopted the position
of the English courts and an increasing minority in the United States.22
Under this view, as with any other workmen's compensation case, con23
nection with employment is the primary criteria for allowing recovery.
Thus, when there is volition to produce death, and it is dearly shown
that this desire is a direct result of a compensable injury, recovery for
24
the suicide should not be denied.
"See Estate of Vernum v. State Univ. of N.Y. College, 4 App. Div. 2d 722, 163
N.Y.S.ad 727 (x957); Seal v. Effron Fuel Oil Co., 284 App. Div. 795, 135 N.Y.S.ad
231 (1954); Widdis v. Collingdale Millwork Co., z69 Pa. Super. 6z2, 84 A.2d 259
(1951).
"The English courts have taken the view that suicide by the employee is compensable if it results from a mental disorder caused by a compensable injury. They
do not insist that the employee be entirely devoid of any consciousness of the consequences of the act of self-destruction. See, e.g., Graham v. Christie, 1o B.W.C.C.
486 (Scot. 1936); Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Co., 13 B.W.C.C. 353 (CA.
1920).

A similar position has been taken by a minority of the courts in this country. The
Florida court, in Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. ad 464 (Fla. x949), stated

that if the suicide would not have occurred but for the injury then compensation should
be allowed.
Mississippi, in Prentiss Truck & Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So. ad
272 (x956), seems to approve and follow the Whitehead case.
New York, since the decision in Pushkarowitz v. A. & M. Kramer, 275 App. Div.
875, 88 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1949), aft'd, 300 N.Y. 637, 90 N.E.ad 494 (3950), appears
to be following the minority view. E.g., Kelly v. Sugarman, 5 App. Div. ad 1023,
173 N.Y.S.ad 41 (1958); Sulfaro v. A. Pellegrino & Sons, 2 App. Div. 2d 4z6, z56
N.Y.S.2d 411 (.956).

Additional support for this view will be found in Vors v. Texas Employers Ins.
Ass'n, 19o F.2d 929 (Sth Cir. 1953) (dictum).
One state which originally followed the majority rule enacted a statute codifying
the minority position. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 152, § 26A (1957).
"'This position is analogous to those cases where a prior injury causes a new
injury or is itself subsequently aggravated. See Unger & Mahon, Inc. v. Lidston, 177
Md. 265, 9 A.ad 6o4 (1939) (ankle injury, employee subsequently fell and fractured

his hip); Kelly v. Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,

N.J. Super. 245, 64

A.ad

(949)
(injured knee put in cast, employee subsequently fell down stairs and broke
his wrist); Randolph v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 33o NJ.L. 353, 33 A.ad
301 (1943) (employee injured his eyes while at work, had to wear dark glasses, subsequently fell down stairs causing the glasses to break puncturing one eye-ball).
See i LARSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 29.10 where the work connection theory
is discussed.

.92

" See

HoRovIrz, CURRENT TREr.s IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 470-72

(3947),

where it is pointed out that:
"[C]ompensation laws were enacted as a humanitarian measure, to create a new
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type liability-liability without fault-to make the industry that was responsible
for the injury bear a major part of the burdens resulting therefrom. It was a revolt
from the old common law and the creation of a complete substitute therefor. . . . It
meant to make liability dependent on a relationship to the job, in a liberal, humane
fashion, with litigation reduced to a minimum. It meant to cut out the narrow common law methods of denying awards.
The early cases tended to be strict; but the later and modern trend was and is
to construe the acts broadly and liberally, to protect the interests of the injured worker
and his dependents."

